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Abstract
We propose a simple dynamical model of the formation of production
networks among monopolistically competitive firms. The model subsumes
the standard general equilibrium approach a` la Arrow-Debreu but displays
a wide set of potential dynamic behaviors. It robustly reproduces key
stylized facts of firms’ demographics. Our main result is that competition
between intermediate good producers generically leads to the emergence
of scale-free production networks.
1 Introduction
The scale-free nature of a wide range of socio-economic networks has been ex-
tensively documented in the recent literature [see e.g. Baraba´si et al., 2009,
Gabaix, 2009, Schweitzer et al., 2009]. However, very few contributions have
investigated the micro-economic origins of these structures. In this paper, we
approach the issue in the context of production networks.
We propose a simple model of out-of-equilibrium dynamics that accounts
for the endogenous formation of supply relationships. The main insight gained
from the model is that the emergence of scale invariance is a natural implication
of competition under the two following assumptions: the number of incoming
business opportunities for a firm is independent of its size and the rate at which
existing consumers may quit grows linearly with the size of the firm. Scale-free
structures then balance the speed at which firms grow and shrink. In other
words, competition inherently induces the formation of scale-free structures.
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This results suggests that institutional aspects of economic activity could explain
empirical findings about the distribution of firms’ size [see Axtell, 2001] as well
as the emergence of aggregate volatility, which is related to the presence of fat
tails in production networks according to Acemoglu et al. [2012].
The backbone of our approach is a model of monopolistic competition on
the markets for intermediate goods, akin to the one introduced by Ethier [1982]
(on the basis of Dixit and Stiglitz [1977]) and popularized by the endogenous
growth literature [see e.g. Romer, 1990]. In this framework, we represent supply
relationships as the weighted edges of a network and consider out-of-equilibrium
dynamics in which (i) demands are made in nominal terms and sellers adjust
their prices to balance real supply and nominal demand and (ii) firms progres-
sively adjust their production technologies (i.e. the network weights) to prevail-
ing market prices. When the set of relationships is fixed (i.e. only the weights of
the network can evolve), the identification with the underlying general equilib-
rium model is perfect in the sense that (i) the adjacency matrix of the network is
in a one to one correspondence with the underlying general-equilibrium economy
and (ii) the model converges to the underlying general equilibrium. However,
the context of interest for us is the one where the technological structure is not
fixed a priori and where, the different production goods being assumed substi-
tutable, firms can, in the long-run, adjust their production technologies/ supply
relationships as a function of market prices. Then, we show that the model
does not in general admit a steady-state, but settles in a dynamic regime where
the distribution of firms’ size and the structure of the production network are
scale-free.
Beyond the emergence of scale-free networks, the model consistently repro-
duces a rich set of stylized facts of firms’ demographics: firms’ sizes are Zipf
distributed, firms’ growth rates follow a Laplace distribution, the variance of
growth rates decreases with size, and there is a negative correlation between
firms’ exit rates and age. This set of stylized facts can be reproduced by a rela-
tively parsimonious model (a simple out-of-equilibrium extension of the Arrow-
Debreu framework) and for a relatively large range of parameters.
Although there exist micro-foundations for some of these stylized facts in the
general equilibrium literature, they have rarely been jointly analyzed. More im-
portantly, the general equilibrium literature on firms’ demographics makes very
strong assumptions about the information available to firms, their farsighted-
ness and their rationality. Its results also rely on very specific assumptions
about the distribution of exogenous shocks faced by the firms. In this frame-
work, it is rather difficult to understand what are the actual driving forces of
firms’ demographics. In contrast, we offer a parsimonious model and a simple
explanation of the emergence of fat tails as a consequence of the asymmetric
effets of competition on firms of different size.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss
the relation of our approach to the literature. In section 3, we give a detailed
description of the model and provide a theoretical analysis of its asymptotic
properties. In section 4, we analyze, via numerical simulations, the stabil-
ity properties of the model and the detailed properties of firms’ demographics
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emerging from its dynamics. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
The network perspective on production structures has been introduced in a se-
ries of contributions that investigated the propagation of shocks in economic
systems (see in particular Bak et al. [1993], Scheinkman and Woodford [1994],
Weisbuch and Battiston [2007], Battiston et al. [2007], Acemoglu et al. [2012]).
Our approach builds on this analogy between input-output structures and di-
rected networks, but focuses on the network formation process and the emer-
gence of scale-invariance. In this respect, it is related to the wide literature
on the determinants of the distribution of firms’ size and more generally firm
demographics. A first strand of work ranging from the seminal work of Kalecki
[1945] and Simon et al. [1977] to more recent contributions such as Bottazzi
and Secchi [2006] have approached the determinants of firms’ demographics
through “island-models” in which the growth of each firm is studied in isola-
tion and driven by exogenous shocks. [Klepper and Thompson, 2006] provides
deep micro-foundations to such approaches by focusing on the development of
sub-markets. It is also worth pointing out that [Gabaix, 1999] has adopted a
similar approach to explain the size distribution of cities.
Firms’ demographics have also been investigated within the general equilib-
rium framework, from a more systemic perspective. The pioneering contribu-
tions of Hopenhayn [1992] and Ericson and Pakes [1995] consider the linkages
between firms’ production and entry and exit decisions at the industry level.
They investigate the optimal organizational response of an industry with respect
to productivity shocks [Hopenhayn, 1992] and/or stochastic competition from
inside and outside the industry [Ericson and Pakes, 1995]. However, these con-
tributions do not provide a precise characterization of distributional properties.
This gap has been filled by a second series of general equilibrium contributions
that have put forward innovation and growth as the key determinants of the
inner organization of the industry. Klette and Kortum [2004] show that the op-
timal R&D response of firms facing (Poisson distributed) competitive risks and
growth opportunities yields Gibrat’s law for the growth of firms (i.e. growth
rate independent of the size) and a logarithmic size distribution. Luttmer [2007]
considers a model with monopolistically competitive firms whose productivity
grows stochastically over time. He explains the formation of a scale-free distri-
bution of firms’ size through the difference between the trends of productivity
growth for incumbent and entering firms. Rossi-Hansberg and Wright [2007]
emphasize the role of the accumulation of industry-specific human capital in
the emergence of scale-free distribution of firms’ size. In particular, they show
that scaling is more important in industries with large industry-specific phys-
ical capital. Their results are backed by empirical evidence on the fact that
“US sectors with larger physical capital shares exhibit significantly more scale
dependence in establishment size dynamics and distributions.”
Our approach retains the dynamic perspective of the “island-based” liter-
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ature and the systemic perspective of the general-equilibrium literature. It is
closer to the strand of literature a` la Hopenhayn [1992] because it focuses on
competition per se and does not require the introduction of aggregate growth
to explain a wide range of stylized facts. The empirical results we obtain are
nevertheless very similar. In particular, our emphasis on the role of competition
is perfectly consistent with the observation made by Rossi-Hansberg and Wright
[2007] that scale dependence increases with fixed costs.
The innovation our model brings to the literature is its relative parsimony
and the reduced role of stochastic shocks in the emergence of scale invariance.
Yet, our most important contribution is to provide a model of formation of
production networks whereas in the existing literature the extent of direct in-
teractions between firms is fairly limited (general equilibrium linkages generally
occur only through final demand). In this respect, the paper contributes to the
literature on the formation of socio-economic networks [see e.g. Jackson et al.,
2008] by providing micro-foundations for the emergence of scale-free networks
which have been largely lacking in this literature, except for notably Jackson
and Rogers [2007]. The recent contribution of Carvalho and Voigtla¨nder [2014]
that applies the model of Jackson and Rogers to the formation of production
networks is hence very closely related to the present contribution. However, our
approach also offers a bridge to the general equilibrium literature.
3 The Model
3.1 The general equilibrium framework
We consider an economy consisting of a finite set of monopolistically competitive
firms producing differentiated goods and of a representative household. We
denote the set of firms by M = {1, · · · ,m}, the representative household by the
index 0 and the set of agents by N = {0, · · · ,m}.
The representative household supplies a constant quantity of labor (normal-
ized to 1) and has preferences represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function of
the form u(x1, · · · , xm) =
∏m
i=1 x
α0,i
i . He shall hence spend his income on each
good i ∈ M proportionally to α0,i (we assume that for all i ∈ M,α0,i > 0, so
that the household consumes a positive quantity of each and every good).
With respect to firms, our central concern is the endogenous formation of
supply relationships. To assume away any exogenous determinism in this re-
spect, we place ourselves in a setting where there is no a priori distinction
between potential intermediate goods. That is, as in standard models of mo-
nopolistic competition on the intermediate goods markets [see Ethier, 1982,
Romer, 1990], we consider that each good can be used interchangeably in the
production process. More precisely, we consider that the production possibilities
of firm i are given by a C.E.S production function of the form:
gi(x0, (xij )j=1,··· ,ni) = x
α
0 (
ni∑
j=1
xθij )
(1−α)/θ (1)
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where α ∈ (0, 1) is the (nominal) share of labor in the input mix, 1/(1−θ) is the
elasticity of substitution, x0 ∈ R+ is the quantity of labor used, ni ∈ N the
number of intermediate goods combined and xij the quantity of the jth input
used by firm i in its production process1.
Remark 1 We assume throughout the paper that θ ∈ [0, 1], that is, inputs
are gross substitute. This implies in particular that productivity grows with the
number of inputs/suppliers combined. This feature is also at the core of the
infra-marginal approach to economic growth [see Yang and Borland, 1991] and
of Adam Smith’s original description of the effects of the division of labor. Also
note that θ = 0 corresponds to the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function
and θ = 1 to a linear production function, i.e. perfectly substitutable inputs.2
As such, this model is incomplete. In order to fully determine the micro-
economic choices of the agents in terms of production or consumption, we have
to introduce additional assumptions on the structure of interactions, i.e. we
have to specify the production network. This network can be characterized by
an adjacency matrix, A = (ai,j)i,j∈M , such that ai,j = 1 if j is a supplier of i
and ai,j = 0 otherwise. Letting Si(A) := {j ∈ M | ai,j = 1} denote the set of
suppliers of firm i, the production function of firm i is then further specialized
into:
fi(x0, (xj)j∈Si(A)) = x
α
0 (
∑
j∈Si(A)
xθj )
(1−α)/θ (2)
Given such a production network A, one can close the model “a` la Arrow-
Debreu” by associating to the production network A, an economy E(A) and a
notion of general equilibrium. The economy E(A) is defined as follows.
Definition 1 The general equilibrium economy E(A) is defined by:
• A representative household supplying one unit of labor and having Cobb-
Douglas preferences u(x1, · · · , xm) =
∏m
i=1 x
α0,i
i .
• A set of firms M with production functions of the form
fi(x0, (xj)j=1,··· ,ni) = x
α
0 (
ni∑
j=1
xθj )
(1−α)/θ (3)
• A production network A consistent with equation (1) in the sense that for
all i ∈M, ∑mj=1 ai,j = ni.
1Note that ni refers here to the number of goods combined not to any indexing of the
goods. Equation 2 provides a more precise characterization.
2 As a matter of fact, we have also conducted numerical experiments for θ ∈ (−∞, 0). The
inner workings of the model are similar to the one presented below but for the fact that low
out-degree firms then are the most productive ones. Most of the results are symmetric except
those that rely on the fact that there is no absolute bound on the productivity of firms when
inputs are substitutable (i.e. each firm can potentially face a more competitive peer). Indeed,
when input are gross complements, firms with a single supplier have maximal productivity.
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As we shall consider in the following that firms are monopolistic competitors,
the notion of general equilibrium we introduce entails monopolistic mark-ups.
Namely:
Definition 2 A general equilibrium with monopolistic mark-up λ of the econ-
omy E(A) is a collection of prices (p∗0, · · · , p∗n) ∈ RM+ , production levels (q∗0 , · · · , q∗n) ∈
RM+ and commodity flows (x∗i,j)i,j=0···n ∈ RM×M+ such that:
1. Markets clear. That is for all i ∈M, one has
q∗i =
M∑
j=1
x∗i,j .
2. The representative consumer maximizes his utility. That is (q∗0 , (x
∗
0,j)j=1,··· ,n)
is a solution to 
max ui((x0,j)j=1,··· ,n)
s.t
∑n
j=1 p
∗
jx
∗
0,j ≤ 1
(with the price of labor normalized to 1)
3. Production costs are minimized. That is for all i ∈ M, (x∗i,j)j=0···n is the
solution to {
min
∑
j∈Si(A) p
∗
jxj
s.t fi(xj) ≥ q∗i
4. Prices are set as a mark-up over production costs at rate
λ
1− λ. That is
one has for all i ∈ N :
p∗i = (1 +
λ
1− λ )
∑
j∈Si(A) p
∗
jx
∗
i,j
q∗i
Remark 2 In a setting with constant returns to scale, profits are zero at a
competitive equilibrium. Hence, for λ = 0, general equilibrium with monopolistic
mark-ups coincide with competitive equilibria where firms maximize profits, that
is, where conditions 3. and 4. are replaced by:
3’. For all i ∈M, (q∗i , (x∗i,j)j∈Si(A)) is a solution to
max p∗i qi −
∑
j∈Si(A) p
∗
jxi,j
s.t fi((xi,j)j∈Si(A)) ≥ qi
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3.2 Dynamics
At a general equilibrium, supply relationships are considered fixed a priori. The
central concern of this paper is the evolution of these relationships, i.e. the
formation of production networks. The existing literature is relatively silent on
the topic: in the endogenous growth literature a` la Romer [1990] and in the
general equilibrium approach to firm dynamics a` la [Luttmer, 2007] or [Rossi-
Hansberg and Wright, 2007], the production structure is evolving but there are
no direct interactions between firms: all the linkages go through final demand.
Our approach will be akin to the one of the out-of-equilibrium literature [see
e.g. Arrow et al., 1959, Fisher, 1989, Arthur, 2006] but beyond the adjustment
of prices and quantities, we will also investigate the evolution of the production
structure.
We assume time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ N. Every period, the state
of agent i is determined by the wealth it holds wti ∈ R+, the stock of output it
has produced qti ∈ R+, the price it sets for its output pti ∈ R+ and the input
shares (αti)i∈N ∈ RN+ it chooses. Moreover, at random times, each agent is
given the opportunity to adapt its supply relationships to the prevailing market
conditions. This determines the evolution of the production network over time,
whose adjacency matrix in period t is denoted by At .
3.2.1 Out-of-equilibirum dynamics
More precisely, during each period t ∈ N, the following sequence of events takes
place:
1. Each agent i ∈ N receives the nominal demand ∑j∈N αti,jwtj .
2. Agents adjust their prices frictionally towards their market-clearing values
according to:
pti = τpp
t
i + (1− τp)pt−1i (4)
where τp ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter measuring the speed of price adjustment
and, given the nominal demand
∑
j∈N α
t
i,jw
t
j and the product stock q
t
i , p
t
i
is the market clearing price for firm i, that is:
pti =
∑
j∈N α
t
i,jw
t
j
qti
. (5)
3. Whenever τp < 1, markets do not clear (except if the system is at a sta-
tionary equilibrium). In case of excess demand, we assume that clients
are rationed proportionally to their demand. In case of excess supply, we
assume that the amount qti :=
∑
j∈N α
t
i,jw
t
j/pti is actually sold and that the
rest of the output is stored as inventory3. Together with production occur-
ring on the basis of purchased inputs, this yields the following evolution
of the product stock:
3The household does not carry an inventory. Equation 6 is modified accordingly in this
case.
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qt+1i = q
t
i − qti + fi(
αt0,iw
t
i
pt0
, (
αtj,iw
t
i
ptj
)j∈Si(At)) (6)
Note that in the case where τp = 1, markets always clear (one has q
t
i = q
t
i)
and equation (6) reduces to
qt+1i = fi(
αt0,iw
t
i
pt0
, (
αtj,iw
t
i
ptj
)j∈Si(At)) (7)
4. As for the evolution of agents’ wealth, it is determined on the one hand by
their purchases of inputs and their sales of output. On the other hand, we
assume that the firm sets its expenses for next period at (1− λ) times its
current revenues and distributes the rest as dividends to the representative
household. One therefore has:
∀i ∈M, wt+1i = (1− λ)qtipti (8)
wt+10 = q
t
0p
t
0 + λ
∑
i∈M
qtip
t
i (9)
Note that equation (8) can be interpreted as assuming that firms have my-
opic expectations about their nominal demand (i.e. they assume they will
face the same nominal demand next period) and target a fixed profit/dividend
share λ ∈ (0, 1).
5. As for the evolution of input shares, agents adjust frictionally their input
combinations towards the cost-minimizing value according to:
αt+1i = τwα
t
i + (1− τw)αti (10)
where τw ∈ [0, 1] measures the speed of technological adjustment and αti ∈
RM denotes the optimal input weights for firm i given prevailing prices.
Those weights are defined as the solution to the following optimization
problem:  max fi(
α0, i
pt0
, (
αj , i
ptj
)j∈Si(At))
s.t.
∑
j∈Si(At) αj,i = 1
(11)
3.2.2 Evolution of the production network
This first sequence of operations defines out-of-equilibrium dynamics in the gen-
eral equilibrium economy E(A), for a given production network A. They are akin
to the dynamics considered in the literature on the stability of general equilib-
rium in the Arrow-Debreu framework [e.g. Arrow et al., 1959, Fisher, 1989,
Arthur, 2006]. As we let the production network evolve, we leave the Arrow-
Debreu framework sensu stricto, and enter the realm of industrial dynamics.
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In this extended setting, our central concern is to determine if the emergence
of empirical regularities, such as scale-free networks, can be explained by the
micro-economic decisions of firms.
For sake of parsimony, and to disentangle the effects of competition from
those of technological change, we place ourselves in a setting where there is no
aggregate growth in productivity nor output (in the long-term). Therefore, we
consider that there can not be entry above the maximal number of firms m and
that the total number of suppliers of each firm is fixed so that the productivity
of a firm cannot grow endogenously (following Remark 1, productivity is related
to the number of suppliers). The sole driver of the evolution of the network is
(monopolistic) competition that we represent by assuming firms can switch sup-
pliers one for one. In other words, we consider that the out-degree distribution
of the production network is fixed and focus on the evolution of the in-degree
distribution.
The detailed evolution of the network is determined as follows. At the end
of every period, each firm independently receives the opportunity to change one
of its suppliers with probability ρchg ∈ [0, 1]. If this opportunity materializes
for firm i in period t, it selects randomly one of its suppliers ji and another
random firm j among those to which it is not already connected. It then shifts
its connection from firm ji to firm j if and only if the price of j is less than the
one of ji. In other words, the adjacency matrix A
t evolves according to:
at+1
i,ji
=
{
1 if pt
ji
≤ ptj
0 otherwise
at+1i,j = 1− at+1i,ji
(12)
The actual weight of the new connection is then determined according to an
average over other suppliers’ weights.
Finally, the possibility for a firm to lose connections implies that it can
eventually be driven out of the market. Indeed, we consider that a firm that
has lost all its connections towards other firms exits the market. To sustain
competition in the economy, we assume that those exits are compensated by
entries of new firms according to the following process. Every period, each
(potential) firm that is out of the market independently enters with probability
pnew. When entering, the firm is endowed with the following characteristics:
• The number of suppliers is drawn from a binomial distribution B(p, n).
The success probability p is adjusted in order to preserve the mean degree
in the network in the long-run.4
• The price is initially set equal to the average price in the economy.
4In order to preserve the total number of links in the network we compute the av-
erage out-degree of inactive firms k¯I and set the success probability in the binomial to
p = k¯I
n
(1 + 10L0−Lt
Lt
) where Lt is the total number of links at time t. As long as the
total number of links does not steadily grow or decline, our results are independent of this
particular implementation.
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• Each firm in the economy rewires to the newly created firm independently
with probability k¯/m, where k¯ is the average number of clients at time 0.
• The wealth of the firm is set equal to the average wealth of other firms
and its initial product stock is empty.5
3.3 Asymptotic analysis
In section 4, we shall explore in depth the dynamic behavior of the model via
simulations. Yet, we can characterize key mechanisms at play in the model
through an analytical characterization of its asymptotic properties.
3.3.1 Asymptotics for a fixed network
Let us first characterize the steady-state of the out-of-equilibrium dynamics de-
fined in subsection 3.2.1 when the production network A is fixed. At a steady
state, equation 6 implies market-clearing and equation 10 implies the minimiza-
tion of costs. Therefore one clearly has:
Proposition 1 Let us consider the production network A is fixed and out-of-
equilibrium dynamics in the economy E(A) are defined as in subsection 3.2.1.
Then, the steady states of the dynamics are general equilibria of the economy
E(A) with monopolistic mark-up λ. Moreover, if λ = 0, these also coincide with
competitive equilibria6.
These results underline the fact that our model formally subsumes the stan-
dard general equilibrium framework when the network is considered as fixed.
Note however that, as illustrated in the next section, the dynamics of the model
do not necessarily yield convergence to the steady state/ general equilibrium and
that a rich taxonomy of asymptotic behavior can be observed at limit cycles.
Remark 3 A direct corollary of this result is that if we let the network struc-
ture evolve according to 3.2.2, the model will have the same steady-states as the
simplified equilibrium model in which every period:
• An equilibrium with monopolistic mark-up λ is computed given the struc-
ture of the production network.
• The production network evolves as described in subsection 3.2.2.
Note, however, that the inclusion of out-of-equilibrium dynamics is crucial for
the stability analysis and the detailed investigation of firms’ demographics per-
formed below.
5To ensure conservation of money in the long term, the initial wealth of the firm is in
practice considered as a loan that the firm has to reimburse before it can pay any dividend.
6See Remark 2
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3.3.2 Asymptotics with an evolving network
We now turn to the investigation of asymptotic properties of the model when the
production structure evolves according to the dynamics defined in subsection
3.2.2. In this extended setting, our central concern is the characterization of the
asymptotic properties of the production network. In particular we are interested
in the potential emergence of fat tails in the degree distribution, whose presence
has been put forward as a salient feature of socio-economic networks [see e.g.
Baraba´si and Albert, 1999] and, more recently, as a key feature in the build-up
of macro-economic volatility [see Acemoglu et al., 2012].
In our setting, the evolution of the production network is driven by compe-
tition between firms. In turn, the primitive determinant of a firm’s competi-
tiveness is its production technology, which is completely characterized by the
number of suppliers/inputs combined (see equation 1). Therefore, the number
of suppliers of a firm i, ni, should be the main determinant of its position in
the network. In this respect, let us recall that the number of suppliers of a firm
is fixed throughout: a firm can change the identity of its suppliers, not their
number. In other words, the out-degrees in the network are fixed and we are
investigating the evolution of the in-degrees.
3.3.3 Steady-states with an evolving network
We shall first characterize the structure of the network at a steady-state of the
dynamics (given in subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2), although it will turn out these
steady states are generally unstable.
The structure of a steady-state of the network is constrained by two condi-
tions. First, links shall be prioritarily directed towards the most competitive
firms. Second, the competitiveness of firms increases with the number of sup-
pliers (see remark 1). Hence, at a steady state, one shall observe a hierarchical
structure for which incoming links are directed first and foremost towards more
competitive (high out-degree) firms. Namely, one has:
Proposition 2 If A = (ai,j)i,j∈M is a steady-state production network, then
one has for all i, j ∈M :
nj < ni ⇒ [∀h ∈M ah,j = 1⇒ ah,i = 1] (13)
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 2 implies that a firm can be linked to a firm with k suppliers
only if it is already linked with all the firms that have more than k suppliers (i.e.
the more competitive firms). This means that steady state networks shall have
a very specific structure: firms are grouped in clusters according to their out-
degree (number of suppliers) and there are links from a firm towards a cluster
only if it is already linked to all firms in higher out-degree clusters (see Appendix
A.2 for a detailed description).
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Remark 4 This structure is reminiscent of nested-split graphs [see Mahadev
and Peled, 1995, Ko¨nig et al., 2012, 2014]. The only difference being the fact
that in our setting a cluster is not necessarily linked to all clusters with higher
out-degrees than its own. Indeed, clusters are associated to out-degrees and, by
definition, the lower the out-degree of a cluster the fewer connections it has.
Another consequence of Proposition 2 is that at a steady-state only the firms
with the maximal number of suppliers actually have consumers. In particular,
for each firm to actually have at least one consumer at the steady-state, there
must exist firms with a very large number of suppliers for the whole set of po-
tential suppliers to be spanned. If this condition is not met, the least productive
firms have no consumers and therefore, as described in subsection 3.2.2, they
must exit the market. However, exit contradicts the very fact that the system
is at a steady-state. Hence, unless there are firms with very large number of
suppliers, the system does not have a steady-state.
As a matter of fact, convergence to a steady-state is not observed in simu-
lations (see below) unless the system is initialized in a very peculiar state (e.g.
by letting all the firms exactly have the same number of suppliers). On the
contrary, we generically observe sustained entry and exit, growth and decline of
firms. It therefore seems that steady states are of little relevance to characterize
the asymptotic behavior of the model.
3.3.4 Stable degree distributions
Meso-level distributional characteristics can be asymptotically stable even in
absence of convergence at the micro-level [see Aoki and Yoshikawa, 2011, for
an extended discussion of the issue]. In our setting, the (in-)degree distribution
of the production network can be stable without the network itself being at a
microscopic steady state. For example, the degree distribution stays unchanged
if a firm of degree k loses a link to a firm of degree (k − 1) : the firm formerly
of degree k becomes of degree (k − 1) while the firm formerly of degree k − 1
becomes of degree k.
In the following, we provide a characterization of the stable degree distribu-
tion in a stylized version of the model, which highlights how competition shapes
the structure of the production network. In a nutshell, there are two effects at
play. On the one hand the number of incoming business opportunities for a firm
is independent of its size. On the other hand, the larger a firm is, the more
it is exposed to competition (i.e. the more likely it is that one of its customer
considers switching). Then, at a statistical equilibrium, the degree distribution
must be scale-free in order to balance the flow of incoming and outgoing links.
In order to clarify this argument, let us consider a simplified version of the
model in which the rewiring probability ρchg is chosen small enough so that
there is a single link swap per period7. Then each firm can win or lose at most
7This is of course an approximation but if ρchg is small enough, the probability that there
is two link swaps in a given period is negligible with respect to the probability that there is
only one.
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one link per period and accordingly each degree class can win or lose at most
one firm per period. Therefore a degree distribution (Pk)k∈N is stationary if the
probabilities for a firm of degree k to lose and to gain a link compensate each
other.
In order to approximate the probability ρk for a firm of degree k to gain a
link, let us first remark that the number of incoming business opportunities for a
firm j is independent of its size (because the switching firm chooses its tentative
new supplier uniformly at random). Hence the probability for a firm to have
the opportunity to catch an incoming link is 1/m. According to Equation 12, the
link will actually be caught if the incumbent supplier is more expensive than
firm j. Now, if one assumes that the competitiveness of the incumbent supplier
is independent of the identity of the switching firm, one can consider that the
switching link is drawn uniformly at random among links. Then, the probability
for firm j to actually catch the link, given it has been drawn as a challenger,
is given by the share ψj ∈ [0, 1] of existing links towards more expensive firms.
Summing-up, one can write the probability for firms of degree k to gain a link
as:
ρk =
∑
{j|dj=k}
1
m
ψj (14)
where dj denotes the degree of firm j. After introducing nk the number of firms
of degree k, the equation can be rewritten as follows:
ρk =
nk
m
∑
{j|dj=k}
ψj
nk
= Pkψk (15)
where ψk is the average share of links towards more expensive firms for firms of
degree k.
In order to approximate the probability µk for a firm of degree k to lose
a link, let us remark that the larger a firm is (i.e. the higher its in-degree),
the more it is exposed to competition. More precisely, the probability that a
firm’s consumer considers switching suppliers is proportional to the number of
consumers that the firm has (i.e. to its in-degree). Hence the probability for
a firm j of degree dj to be at risk of losing a consumer is dj/md˜ where d˜ is the
mean degree in the network (and hence md˜ is the total number of links in the
network). Now, firm j will actually lose the link if the challenger firm, which is
selected uniformly at random, is more competitive. Hence the probability for
firm j to actually lose a link, given it has been drawn as an incumbent, is given
by the share φj ∈ [0, 1] of firms that are cheaper than j. Summing-up, one can
write the probability for firms of degree k to lose a link as:
µk =
∑
{j|dj=k}
dj
md˜
φj =
∑
{j|dj=k}
k
md˜
φj (16)
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Or equivalently
µk =
1
d˜
k
nk
m
∑
{j|dj=k}
φj
nk
=
1
d˜
kPkφk (17)
where φk is the average position in the price ordering of firms of degree k.
Contrasting equations (15) and (17), one remarks that the competitive pres-
sure faced by a firm increases linearly with its degree, while the number of
incoming business opportunities are independent of the current size/degree.
Namely, the ratio between the flows of incoming and outgoing links is given
by:
µk
ρk
=
k
d˜
φk
ψk
, (18)
As emphasized above, a sufficient condition for a distribution to be sta-
tionary is then to balance the flow of incoming and outgoing links. Namely if
(Pk)k∈N is a stationary distribution, Fk its cumulative distribution and ρk and
µk the associated transition rates, one shall have ρk ' µk. Now, at a station-
ary distribution, the competitiveness of firms shall increase with the degree and
hence firms shall only lose incoming links towards higher degree firms. In other
words, the share of firms that are more expensive than firms of degree k, φk, is
the tail of the degree distribution, 1− Fk. Hence, one has:
µk ' 1
d˜
kPk(1− Fk). (19)
and therefore
Pkψk ' 1
d˜
kPk(1− Fk). (20)
As moreover ψk, being a probability, satisfies limk→+∞ ψk = 1, it must be that:
1− F k ∼k→+∞ d˜
k
. (21)
That is the degree distribution of the production network asymptotically
follows Zipf’s law. Formally, one has:
Proposition 3 Assume ρk and µk are transition rates such that Equation (18)
holds and let (P k)k∈N be an associated stationary distribution. Then, one has:
F k :=
k∑
`=1
P ` ∼+∞ 1− d˜
k
(22)
Several remarks are in order about Proposition 3.
1. The proposition focuses on the formation of the tail of the degree distri-
bution. The asymptotic nature of the result implies that one abstracts
away from the finite nature of the numerical model and considers a limit
model with a countably infinite number of firms. Note in this respect that
condition (18) is stated independently of the number of firms.
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2. We obtain asymptotic convergence to a scale-free distribution with loga-
rithmically diverging mean while the mean is, by construction, finite in
the original model. This discrepancy might be explained by the fact that
our analytical approximation overestimates the probability of receiving
an incoming link as it does not account for the entry and exit of firms
nor for the fact that firms must choose distinct suppliers. Nevertheless,
the analytical result is clearly in line with the results of numerical exper-
iments (see below), but for a small upward bias in the exponent of the
distribution.
3. The existence and the characterization of the stationary degree distribu-
tion are independent of the elasticity of substitution and of most of the
other parameters of the model.
4. A complete characterization of the class of distribution obeying a master
equation with transition rates given by equations (15) and (17) is beyond
the scope of this paper but preliminary results suggest that they might
yield a rich set of scale-free structures.
Proposition 3 highlights the fact that competition shapes the structure of the
production network. The structure must be consistent with the speeds at which
firms grow (at the expense of less competitive peers) and shrink (in favor of more
competitive peers). Fat-tails in the degree distribution hence emerge because of
two basic facts about the “economy” of suppliers’ switches. On the one hand,
the number of incoming business opportunities for a firm is independent of its
size, i.e. firms gain link at a constant rate. On the other hand, the larger a
firm is (i.e. the higher its in-degree), the more it is exposed to competition.
Indeed, the rate at which existing consumers may quit grows linearly with the
size of the firm, i.e. firms lose links proportionally to their degree. Then, at a
statistical equilibrium, the degree/size distribution must be scale-free in order
to balance the flow of incoming and outgoing links.
The process can be seen as a from of inverted preferential attachment [see
Baraba´si and Albert, 1999] where asymptotically large firms lose connections
proportionally to their degree (whereas in the standard preferential attachment
model finite-size nodes gain new links proportionally to their degree).
4 Numerical Analysis
Numerical simulations allow us to investigate the dynamic stability of the model
and to compare its distributional properties with empirical data on firm demo-
graphics. We report below the result of an extensive series of simulations for a
model with M = 10000 firms (and M = 2000 firms in the simplest case with
ρchg = 0) and representative samples of parameters.
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4.1 Stability
4.1.1 General Equilibrium
Proceeding stepwise as in the preceding section, we first consider the case where
the adjacency structure is fixed and therefore focus on the stability of a general
equilibrium with monopolistic mark-up λ for the out-of-equilibrium dynamics
introduced in subsection 3.2.1. This problem is very similar to that of the stabil-
ity of general equilibrium, which has been extensively studied in the literature
[see Fisher, 2011, for a recent survey]. However, in our framework, behavior is
much more local/decentralized and boundedly rational than generally is in the
general equilibrium literature (firms have myopic expectations about their de-
mand and update their prices in an adaptive manner). Therefore, it is extremely
difficult to apply the standard apparatus of differential calculus to investigate
stability issues. However, simulations provide very clearcut results.
While the adjacency structure is fixed, there are only three parameters shap-
ing the qualitative behavior of the economy in our model: the speed of price
adjustment τp, the speed of technological adjustment τw and the elasticity pa-
rameter θ. In particular, for a given value of the elasticity parameter θ, the
speeds of price and technological adjustment determine whether the underlying
general equilibrium of the economy is dynamically stable. A numerical inves-
tigation of the model indeed reveals the presence of 3 distinct phases of the
economy (see the phase diagram depicted in Figure 1):
1. For very low speed of the price adjustment process (and independently
of the speed of technological adjustment) the economy is characterized
by a synchronized state with large ”cyclical volatility”. As illustrated
in Figure 2, the system then oscillates between inflation and deflation,
excess demand and excess supply, positive and negative profits. In this
phase, as the prices evolve too slowly, inventories carry the burden of
adjustment. This leads to very strong feedback effects which entail a
synchronized state of the economy (as in Gualdi et al. [2015b] and Gualdi
et al. [2015a]).8 Figure 3 illustrates the processes at play during a cycle.
During a first phase, production is larger than demand and firms build up
stocks while the price adjusts downwards. During a second phase (after the
inflection of the supply-demand curve), demand is larger than supply, the
stocks get built down but prices keep adjusting downwards (there is still
excess supply as the inventory is non-empty). The price keeps adjusting
downwards until the stocks are completely depleted. At this stage, excess
demand is at a maximum and profits at a minimum because prices are
low and stocks are empty. Yet, in absence of buffer stocks, prices become
more volatile and increase rapidly until excess demand is absorbed and a
new cycle starts.
8Note that while in Gualdi et al. [2015b] the main driver for the emergence of the synchro-
nized state was the accumulation of debt, in our case the driver seems to be the accumulation
/ depletion of product stocks.
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2. For intermediate speeds of price adjustment the system converges to equi-
librium (see Figure 2). This phase is largely predominant and will be the
setting used for the analysis of distributional firms and network properties
carried out in the following.
3. When both price and technological adjustment speeds are high the econ-
omy reaches an “excess demand” phase with rationing. There is persistent
mismatch between supply and demand, positive inflation and sustained
volatility in the network (see Figure 2 as well).9 Note however that this
phase disappears for values of the elasticity parameter θ below a threshold
θ∗ (θ∗ ∼ 5/9). In practice, this phase is less robust and manifests itself
only for values of θ close enough to 1.
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Figure 1: Phase diagram of the model with ρchg = 0 for θ = 4/5. Note that the
unstable phase in the upper right corner disappears for values of the elasticity
parameter θ sufficiently smaller than 1 (see details in the text).
Hence, despite its simplicity (there is no evolution of the adjacency struc-
ture of the network at this stage), the model displays a very rich taxonomy of
behavior: general equilibrium, rationing and periodic “overproduction” crisis.
The key determinant of the transition between the stable general equilibrium
phase and the unstable “excess demand” phase is the relative speed of price
(τp) and technological (τw) adjustment. The faster the relative speed of price
adjustment, the more stable is the system. Yet, the stability range increases as
the absolute speed of price adjustment decreases 10. Moreover, the size of the
stable region increases both as the elasticity of substitution decreases and as the
9Note that disequilibrium appears to materialize via inflation and excess demand (the
inflation is small but persistently positive in the upper-left corner of Figure 2) rather than via
deflation and excess supply. This is however an aggregate view which averages excess demand
and excess supply, increasing and decreasing prices. Yet, there is a bias towards inflation and
excess demand because the price adjustment process (Equation 4) induces an asymmetry in
the magnitude of the price adjustments upwards and downwards.
10These results are reminiscent of those obtained in Bonart et al. [2014]: the larger the
intrinsic volatility of the system (in our setting, the higher the elasticity of substitution), the
slower the adjustment processes shall be for the system to be stable.
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share of labor in the input mix increases (i.e. for larger values of the parameter
α in the production function).
1000 1500 2000
time
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
in
fla
tio
n 
(%
)
1000 1500 2000
time
-2
0
2
4
6
8
<
 s
up
pl
y 
- d
em
an
d 
>
1000 1500 2000
time
0
1
2
to
ta
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n
1000 1500 2000
time
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
av
er
ag
e 
pr
of
its
 x
 1
05
Figure 2: One time-step inflation rate, average mismatch between supply and
demand, total production and average firms profits as a function of time for the
basic model (ρchg = 0) and three different values of τp, τw corresponding to
different regions of Figure 1: τp = 0.5 and τw = 0.5 (black lines), τp = 0.9 and
τw = 0.9 (red lines), τp = 0.05 and τw = 0.5 (green lines). Other parameters
are: θ = 4/5, λ = 0.05, M = 2000.
4.1.2 Network Structure
In order to investigate numerically the asymptotic properties of the production
network, we have performed a second series of simulations in which the adja-
cency structure evolves (i.e. ρchg > 0) according to the competitiveness of firms
(see 3.2.2). The results we observe are consistent with Proposition 3 and robust.
As long as the parameters are in the predominant general-equilibrium phase, the
distribution of firms’ in-degree converges to a power-law with an exponent close
to 1 (i.e. the Zipf distribution) for large enough in-degrees. Convergence occurs
independently of the initial distribution of firms’ sizes and both the power-law
nature and the exponent of the limit distribution do not depend on the param-
eters used in the simulations, in particular the elasticity of substitution.
In more details, we observe that the convergence to the invariant distribution
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Figure 3: Average excess supply, inflation and average profit as a function of
time for a cycle observed in Figure 2 for τp = 0.05 and τw = 0.5. Inflation
and profits are rescaled for illustrative purposes. Other parameters are as in
Figure 2.
is extremely long (approximately 106 time steps) but after convergence the re-
sults of a particular realization are representative of the average across multiple
realizations. From a qualitative point of view, we observe two different regimes:
• In the predominant region of the parameter space, which corresponds to
the general equilibrium phase described in the preceding section, we ob-
serve convergence to an invariant distribution characterized by strong het-
erogeneity of firms in-degrees (provided there is initially a minimal amount
of heterogeneity11). In order to characterize the tail of the distribution,
we follow the procedure put forward in Clauset et al. [2009] and perform
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test first on a series of 100 simulations correspond-
ing to different seeds and initial networks for fixed parameters. We obtain
a very good fit to a power-law with exponent close to 1 (i.e. the Zipf
distribution). Figure 4 illustrates the result for a given realization of the
model (after 4 106 time steps) while Table 1 provides statistical evidence
(over 100 simulations) about the power-law nature of the tail of the in-
degree distribution, as well as that of the size of firms (measured either
by their sales or by the total incoming weight they receive). We have
then performed extensive simulations both over different pairs τp, τw in
the general equilibrium phase (20 simulations) and over different pairs
pnew, ρchg ∈ [0.01, 0.2] (50 simulations). In both cases we do not observe
departures from the results shown in Table 1. We have also checked differ-
ent values of the elasticity of substitution as well as different mark-ups λ,
which also give results perfectly consistent with Table 1 confirming that
both the power-law nature of the tail and its exponent are stable features
of the model. Note however that, since the exponent is independent of
11That is unless all the firms are initialized with the same number of suppliers.
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the parameters, the distribution cannot be scale-free on the whole range
because the average in-degree is fixed by the total number of links in the
network.
Remark 5 For negative values of θ (corresponding to complementary
goods) we still observe convergence to a broad distribution, but in this
case the power law regime is recovered only for intermediate in-degrees.
Indeed, the tail of the distribution corresponds in this setting to a patho-
logical case where firms’ competitiveness is bounded by a minimum number
of suppliers (equal to one). From this point of view the model presented
in this paper has to be generalized (for example by allowing heterogenous
pre-factors in the production function) in order to be consistent with the
presence of complementary goods.
Remark 6 We do not account for inter-temporal substitution of con-
sumption in the dynamics considered above. Indeed, in absence of invest-
ment opportunities for firms, there cannot be a demand for credit from the
productive side and savings wouldn’t bear an interest rate. Therefore, the
only motive for savings would be to hedge against potential income shocks.
Such savings could potentially smoothen the macro-economic fluctuations
and hence decrease the size of the unstable phase of the economy (see fig-
ure 1). However, they are unlikely to have any impact on the structure of
the production networks that emerge within the stable phase.
variable exponent xmin KS p-value
in-degree 1.07± 0.01 13± 6 0.69± 0.21
total incoming weight 1.26± 0.06 1.25± 0.32 0.80± 0.23
total sales 1.19± 0.06 2± 0.4 10−3 0.57± 0.22
Table 1: Results of statistical tests for power-law tails of the distributions plot-
ted in Figure 4. This results are averages over 100 realizations with different
seeds and initial networks (but fixed parameters corresponding to Fig. 4). The
estimated exponent refers to the complementary cumulative distribution. All
computations are performed using the R package “PoweRlaw”.
• If the parameters of the model lie outside the general equilibrium phase
depicted in Figure 1 (or if firms all have the same number of suppliers),
firms’ characteristics remain relatively homogeneous: we do not observe
the emergence of fat-tails and the support of the asymptotic distribution
is only mildly larger than at initialization. Proposition 3 cannot be ap-
plied either because prices fluctuate wildly due to network synchronization
effects (hence there is no clear correspondence between the price of a firm
and its competitiveness) or because firms do not differentiate in terms of
competitiveness (i.e. if the number of suppliers is the same for all firms).
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Figure 4: Basic firms statistics after 4 106 time steps for a particular run of
the model with ρchg = 0.01 and ρnew = 0.05. Top: Cumulative frequency for
the number of incoming links (clients) and total incoming weight (sum over all
clients weights). Bottom: Cumulative frequency for total sales and profits his-
togram. Dashed red lines correspond to the power-law fit performed with the
R package poweRlaw on the distributions. Average results of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test and fitted parameters are summarized in Table 1. Other parame-
ters are: θ = 0.5, τp = τw = 0.8 and M = 10000.
• Finally, in the extreme case where there is no entry (i.e. pnew = 0) the less
competitive firms definitively exit the market and only approximately 1%
of the initial number of firms survive. The network converges to a steady-
state with a hierarchical structure consistent with Proposition 2 (see also
the discussion following Remark 4). Figure 5 illustrates this situation via
a scatter plot of the final number of clients as a function of the number of
suppliers. Different in-degrees for the same out-degree are due to the fact
that depending on the particular place in the supply chain firms with the
same production capabilities may offer slightly different prices.
Remark 7 The results of this subsection offer a partial reciprocal to Remark 3 :
it is necessary that the equivalence with the simplified model sketched in remark
3 holds, i.e. that convergence to general equilibrium occurs when the network is
fixed, for the model to display a consistent asymptotic behavior.
To sum up, under very general conditions (as long as τp and τw lie in the gen-
eral equilibrium phase), our model converges to a self-organized state character-
ized by heterogenous firm and network properties. The distributional properties
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Figure 5: Illustration of the extreme situation where there is no entry (pnew =
0). At the steady state only more competitive firms survive (∼ 1% of the total).
In this plot we show the final in-degree as a function of the number of suppliers
(out-degree). There is a direct relation between the out-degree and the in-degree
consistently with Proposition 2. Firms with the same number of suppliers only
differentiate for their position in the supply chain. Parameters are the same as
in Figure 4.
appear as independent of the parameters of the simulations and match stylized
empirical facts about the distribution of firms’ size and connectivity. The in-
troduction of a minimal amount of technological change in a simple model of
monopolistic competition suffices to reproduce key stylized facts about the dis-
tribution of firms’ size and the structure of production networks. Indeed, it
suffices to allow firms to shift between suppliers rather than to consider that
the production infrastructure is fixed to observe the endogenous emergence of
scale-free structures. This result is in line with the literature [e.g. Hopenhayn,
1992, Rossi-Hansberg and Wright, 2007, Luttmer, 2007] but very parsimonious
in terms of rationality and complexity. Moreover, beyond size and degree distri-
butions, the model is able to reproduce key stylized facts of firms’ demographics,
as described below.
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4.2 Distribution of firms’ growth rates
A first major stylized fact of firms’ demographics is that the growth rates of
firms are distributed according to a “tent-shaped” double-exponential distri-
bution [see Bottazzi and Secchi, 2006]. As illustrated in Figure 6, our model
reproduces well this type of Laplace distributions. The exponential distribu-
tion is a good fit for the central part of the support, while extreme values of the
growth rates exhibit fatter tails. We show results for two different time intervals
used in the computation of growth rates, in both cases we take the last (up to a
maximum of 30) recordings of firms sales. As one can see shorter time intervals
naturally result in a steeper descent of the exponential. To provide an estimate
of the parameter of the distribution we fit the two distributions via a maximum-
likelihood fit with f(x) = b± exp (−b±|x|) and find: b+ = 7.11±0.03 (red dashed
line) and b+ = 18.05± 0.06 (black dashed line) for x > 0; b− = 8.95± 0.04 (red
dashed line) and b− = 19.22 ± 0.06 (black dashed line) for x < 0. All fits are
done in the interval |x| ∈ [0.05, 0.5] and are just for illustrative purposes since
the exponential distribution cannot fit data in all the range failing a statistical
test. As for the results in the previous subsection we do not observe any de-
pendence on the parameters of the model with the exception in this case of the
ρchg parameter. Higher values of ρchg indeed result in a more gradual descent of
the exponential. This is a rather intuitive result since increasing ρchg results in
more link swaps per time step and therefore allows firms to grow/decline faster.
Following Arthur [1994], Bottazzi and Secchi [2006] put forward the fact that
a Laplace type of distribution emerges because market success is cumulative
or self-reinforcing. In their “island-based” model, this self-reinforcing process
is hard-wired into the model: “we model this idea using a process whereby the
probability for a given firm to obtain new opportunities depends on the number of
opportunities already caught.” In our setting, “self-reinforcing success” is also at
play but it emerges endogenously. Indeed, the price-setting process (see equation
4) is such that whenever a firm gains a new consumer, its price increases (directly
but also indirectly through the increased demand that it addresses to his own
suppliers) and hence its competitiveness decreases. However, the larger the firm
is, the weaker the effect of an additional consumer is on its price and hence the
more competitive it remains. Therefore, larger firms are more competitive and
can seize more frequently new business opportunities.
.
4.3 Size and variance of growth rates
A second major stylized fact of firms’ demographics concerns the negative re-
lation between the variance of growth rates and the size of firms [see Coad,
2009, and references therein]. More precisely, the empirical literature [see e.g.
Amaral et al., 1997] documents a relation of the form σ(s) ∼ s−β , where s is
the size of the firm and σ(s) the variance of growth rates for firms of size s. In
order to analyze the fit of the model to this relation, we follow Amaral et al.
[1997] and group firms according to their sales in log-bins with base = 1.1 and
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compute the standard deviation of growth rates within each bin. As one can
see in Figure 6, numerical data perfectly matches the functional relation found
in the empirical literature. A linear fit of the logarithm of the standard devia-
tion versus the logarithm of sales gives values of β equal to 0.075 ± 0.001 (for
dt = 104) and 0.072± 0.002 (for dt = 103), both with 0.1% significance. In this
respect, our estimate of the parameter β is smaller by a factor of 3 than the one
found in [Amaral et al., 1997] and [Bottazzi et al., 2001]. We do not observe
any dependance of the estimate with respect to parameters of the model.
Finally, we also check departures from Gibrat’s Law by regressing the model
log (st/s¯t) = γ log (st−1/s¯t−1) +  (23)
where st is the size of the firm at time t and s¯t is the average over all firms.
This is a standard test in the empirical literature [see Bottazzi et al., 2001, and
references therein] which highlights deviations from the ”law of proportionate
effect” (where the proportional rate of growth of a firm is independent of its
size) as long as the value of γ is found significantly different than 1. In our case
we always find values of γ ranging from 0.993 for dt = 103 to 0.97 for dt = 104
(both with a negligible error and 0.1% significance) implying a mild reversion
to the mean effect, i.e. smaller firms tend to grow faster, at least on longer time
scales.
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Figure 6: Distribution of firms’ growth rates (left plot) and standard deviation
of firms growth rates as a function of total sales (right) after 4 106 time steps for
the same parameter setting as in Figure 4. Different symbols / colors correspond
to different time intervals to compute growth rates (for each firm we plot only
the last 30 rates).
4.4 Exit rates and age
We conclude this empirical section with results about firms’ exit rates. In
Figure 7 (left) we plot the distribution of firm exit rates, i.e. the number of
bankrupted firms per time step, which is very well approximated by an expo-
nential of parameter 1/2.
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The empirical literature about firms’ exit rates highlights that there is a
negative correlation between firm exit rates and both size and age [see e.g.
Klette and Kortum, 2004]. While in our model we cannot study the relation
between exit and size (our firms exit when they are of size 0 by definition,) we
can measure the frequency of exits conditional on firm age. In order to do so,
we record in the last 2 106 time steps of the simulation both the time of each
bankruptcy and the age of the bankrupted firm. We then bin firms’ ages in
log-bins with base 1.1 and compute the average frequency of bankruptcies per
unit of time in any bin. Finally, we compute the ratio between the bankruptcy
frequency and the stationary frequency of active firms in any bin. As one can
see in Figure 7 (right) after a typical time of order k¯/ρchg, older firms have an
exponentially decaying probability of exiting.12 An exponential fit ∼ exp (−at)
of the tail of the distribution is a good approximation and gives a = 0.12.
Note that the scope of this section is just to give a qualitative understanding
of the relation between age and exit probability. Indeed, the model cannot
yield a realistic age distribution of firms because age and size are too strongly
connected in our framework: the random selection of new suppliers implies that
large firms are there since longer times. Hence, the age distribution of firms
reflects the size distribution: it is characterized by power-law tails. This is
clearly an unrealistic feature of the model and it also alters the relationship
between age and exit rate.
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Figure 7: Distribution of the number of bankruptcies per unit of time (left plot)
and distribution of exit frequencies as a function of the age of the firm (right
plot).
5 Conclusion
The model of monopolistic competition on the markets for intermediate goods
is central both to the international trade and the endogenous growth literature
12This is because at each time step ρchg firms change one supplier. If the average degree in
the network is k¯, the expected waiting time for a firm to exit is k¯/ρchg .
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[Ethier, 1982, Romer, 1990]. In this paper, we develop a simple agent-based dy-
namic extension of this model in order to investigate the endogenous formation
of production networks. The model subsumes the standard general equilibrium
approach and robustly reproduces key stylized facts of firms’ demographics.
First and foremost, the model shows that competition between intermediate
good producers generically leads to the emergence of scale-free production net-
work and distribution of firms’ size. The continuous inflow of new firms shifts
away the model from a steady state to a “dynamic equilibrium” in which firms
get scaled according to their resistance to competitive forces. Second, the model
is able to reproduce a large set of stylized facts of firms’ demographics such as
the distribution of growth rates or the negative relation between the variance
of growth rate and the size of firms.
Disequilibrium and agent-based models are often criticized for their lack
of clarity. We arguably overcome this issue here by providing both numerical
simulations and analytical results (in an approximation of the model). More
broadly, the paper shows that disequilibrium models can provide very clearcut
economic intuitions: the parsimony of our model allows to put forward very
clearly the relationship between the emergence of fat tails and the asymmetric
effects of competition on firms of different size. In contrast, general equilibrium
models of industrial dynamics usually have a fairly complex architecture that
does not lend itself to a straightforward identification of causal relationships. A
major conceptual difference between both approaches is that in general equilib-
rium competition is a driving force towards equilibrium while, in our framework,
competition affects the structure of the economy and disrupts equilibrium.
The introduction of disequilibrium also sheds new light on the issue of net-
work formation. Our disequilibrium approach provides simple micro-foundations
for the emergence of scale-free networks, while game-theoretic models give raise
to much more regular networks than those observed empirically. As a matter of
fact, in our setting, if the model were to reach a micro steady-state, scale-free
networks would not materialize.
As a whole, these results illustrate the potential of out-of-equilibrium dy-
namics to model the formation of production networks while accounting for
empirical regularities. A natural extension of this work is to consider the possi-
bility of endogenous technological change and its impact on the structure of the
network. Indeed, an originality of our approach is to consider that technology is
embedded within the production network. This suggests to consider increasing
connectivity in the network as a natural avenue to represent growth through
increasing variety. Relatedly, the model could be extended to analyze the im-
pact of policy or environmental shocks on industrial organization. From a more
theoretical perspective, our approach could be extended to investigate the for-
mation of other types of socio-economic networks using context-specific models
and out-of-equilibrium dynamics in complement to equilibrium game-theoretic
approaches that provide very clear intuitions about the determinants of network
formation, but are unable to reproduce the complexity of actual networks.
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30
A Asymptotic Analysis
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: A steady state consists in vectors of wealths w˜, prices p˜, productions q˜
and in an adjacency matrix A˜ satisfying the following properties.
• First, according to equation 12, each firm i buys only from the cheapest
suppliers (otherwise it would rewire). That is, one has for all i ∈ N :
max
{j|a˜i,j=1}
p˜j ≤ min{k|a˜i,k=0} p˜k (24)
• Second, firms only differ in terms of their number of suppliers ni and,
at a steady state, the larger the number of suppliers of a firm, the more
productive and cheaper it is. Otherwise, it could adopt the same production
technique as any firm with a smaller number of suppliers and improve upon
it by diversifying marginally. Therefore, one has for all i, j ∈M :
ni > nj ⇒ p˜i < p˜j (25)
• Combining equations (24) and (25), one gets:
min
{j|a˜i,j=1}
nj ≥ max{k|a˜i,k=0}nk (26)
and therefore
nj < ni ⇒ [∀h ∈M ah,j = 1⇒ ah,i = 1]. (27)
This ends the proof.
A.2 Structure of steady-state networks
Let us denote by Mι := {f ∈ M | nf = ι} the set of firms with exactly ι
suppliers, by mι the number of such firms, by ι1 ≥ ι2 ≥ · · · ≥ ιr the decreasing
sequence of ιs for which Mι 6= ∅ and let φi =
∑i
j=1mιj be the total number of
firms with more than ιi suppliers. Then, at a steady state, each firm in Mιi is
linked to every firm in the Mιks such that φιk ≤ ιi, and to ιi − φ` firms in the
cluster ` such that φ` ≤ ιi− < φ`+1. Accordingly, the in-degree distribution of
the network is such that all firms in Mιi have approximately the same number
of incoming links
∑
{k|k≥ιi}mk.
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